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Improvements in communication, transportation, and technology continue to drive business 
globalization.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one way in which firms can globalize.  
Although firms seeking FDI opportunities may investigate the commercial, economic, political, 
and natural resource environment of the potential host country, cultural issues including crisis 
management attitudes are sometimes overlooked.  This study reviews crisis management 
considerations, investigates attitudes of indifference displayed by Guatemalan businesses with 






mprovements in communication, transportation, and technology continue to drive the globalization of 
the world economy.  “There can be no doubt but that globalization is a wave of the future, and that the 
trend of the 21
st
 Century will be to witness an ever-increasing degree of international cooperation on 
both a regional and a world-wide basis” (Le Veness & Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 65).  One way in which firms choose 
to participate in globalization is through use of foreign direct investment (FDI) initiatives.  Taylor defines FDI as 
“investment that creates a lasting management interest, often defined as more than 10 percent of voting stock in a 
company” and documents the strong growth of FDI by noting, “Annual global flows of [FDI] rose from $200 billion 
in 1990 to nearly $900 billion in 1999” (2002, p. 24).   
 
Ramirez (2002) summarizes Dunning’s explanation of the primary competitive advantages regarding FDI.  
He notes that first, the establishment of transnational corporation (TNC) subsidiaries give the parent firms exclusive 
rights to patents, trademarks, and commercial and production secrets, effectively denying access to both foreign and 
domestic competitors.  Second, these subsidiaries generate location-related advantages such as direct access to 
growing markets and lower unit labor costs, reduced transportation and communication costs, avoidance of tariffs, 
and direct access to raw materials and intermediate products.  Finally, TNCs derive advantage from internalizing 
certain research, development, production, and marketing operations because utilizing some market mechanisms 
such as leasing licenses and advertising agencies can be relatively burdensome and costly.   
 
Although FDI can provide significant strategic advantage to TNCs, the decision to pursue FDI 
opportunities should not be taken lightly.  Serious consideration must be given to the commercial, economic, 
political, natural resource, and cultural environment of the potential host country.  One region enjoying increased 
attention related to many of the factors conducive to potential FDI is Central America.    
 
Festervand (2002) notes that FDI in emerging Central American countries has tripled over the past decade, 
influenced in part by initiatives such as NAFTA, the Reciprocal Protection of Investment Treaty between the U.S. 
and Nicaragua in 1995, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and other trade fostering agreements.  Within Central 
America, Guatemala is drawing the increased attention of TNCs seeking FDI opportunities.  Festervand created a 
perceptual mapping by professionals from U.S. industrial organizations of ten emerging Central American countries.  
I 
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Respondents ranked Guatemala high in strategic opportunistic position based on the dimensions of market 
opportunities, advantageous business requirements, and relative economic and political stability.   
 
Guatemala is the largest and most densely populated country in Central America, with an economy built on 
two major sectors: agriculture and retail.  Both sectors provide tremendous potential for economic development and 
are comprised primarily of small businesses.  Guatemala is rich in minerals, oil, and other natural resources, and 
boasts low labor costs.  The nation has a fast growing light industry sector and the largest industrial base in Central 
America.  Guatemala is considered an important manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, clothing, wood, and 
food products (Mahler, 1999).  Given its rich resources, low labor costs, large industrial base, ample market 
opportunities, and relatively high degree of economic and political stability, there is little doubt that TNCs will 
continue to consider Guatemala an attractive source of FDI opportunities. 
 
Yet TNCs seeking successful FDI opportunities need focus on more than commercial, economic, political, 
and natural resource factors.  To create truly valuable FDI, TNCs must investigate the cultural implications of 
potential opportunities.  Proffit et al. (1997) detail a difficulty faced by TNCs seeking FDI opportunities in Russia as 
a result of decades of communist enculturation.  The cultural remnant relates to the communist doctrine that all 
citizens have the right to work; this belief causes tremendous difficulties for free marketers attempting to implement 
employment-at-will practices which give managers significant latitude to fire and discipline employees.  So far, 
Russian law has not sanctioned employment-at-will practices, further adding legal complexity to the already 
culturally sensitive subject. 
 
One cultural issue sometimes neglected in evaluating FDI opportunities relates to attitudes of firms in the 
host country with respect to crisis management.  Crisis management aims to minimize the impact of an unexpected 
event in the life of an organization (Spillan & Hough, 2003).  Many large organizations, hopefully including TNCs 
with sufficient sophistication to pursue FDI, have highly developed crisis management plans and teams that are 
ready and rehearsed for crises.  The supply chains of these firms, often consisting largely of small businesses, may 
lack a sufficient degree of sophistication with respect to crisis management philosophies, or may have cultures in 
which crisis management practices are considered unnecessary.   
 
Even TNCs which otherwise are thorough in assessing major risk factors of potential FDI opportunities 
may fail to assess the viability of small businesses in the potential supply chain with respect to their crisis 
management attitudes.  Sheffi (2001, p. 6) notes that “more than ever, corporations should realize that their long-
term fate is intertwined with that of their suppliers, customers, and even their competitors.”  Not only must managers 
of TNCs engaging in Guatemalan FDI initiatives prepare for potential internal crises, they should also be sufficiently 
familiar with the crisis management philosophies of the primarily small businesses that are a critical component of 
the Guatemalan supply chain.  
 
This study will investigate the cultural climate that TNCs seeking FDI opportunities in Guatemala may 
encounter with respect to crisis management.  The study first will review current literature related to the crisis 
environment and crisis management, including attention given it by small businesses.  Next, the authors will relate 
the methodology and results of their crisis management survey conducted in Guatemala.  Finally, we will discuss the 






A wealth of management literature suggests that organizations are naturally reactive concerning potential 
future crises, perhaps because managers believe crises are unlikely to happen to them (Mitroff, Pauchant, and 
Shrivastava, 1989; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Penrose, 2000, Shrivastava, 1993).  As shown in Table 1 however, 
crises do occur despite businesses’ beliefs that they are somehow immune.  Crandall, et al. (1999) broadly group 
crises into five categories: operational, public image, fraud, natural disaster, and legal crises.  These crises can 
devastate wherever they occur, but their effect can be magnified in an unfamiliar environment.   
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Table 1 
Crisis Classification Framework 
Category Impact Crisis Events 
Operational  Short-term or long-term disruption of 
organization’s daily activities 
Loss of records permanently due to fire 
Computer system breakdown 
Loss of records permanently due to computer system breakdown 
Computer system invaded by hacker 
Major industrial accident 
Major product/service malfunction 
Death of key executive 
Breakdown of a major piece of production/service equipment 
Public Image Negative public perception Boycott by consumers or the public 
Product sabotage 
Negative media coverage 
Fraud Loss of stakeholder confidence, 
reduced employee morale and 
productivity  
Theft or disappearance of records 
Embezzlement by employee(s) 
Corruption by management 
Corporate espionage 
Theft of company property 




Temporary or permanent disruption of 
daily activities, destruction of facilities 





Legal  Negative public perception, loss of 
stakeholder confidence, bankruptcy 
due to cost of legal representation or 
payment of fines and penalties 




Adapted from Crandall, et al. (1999). 
 
 
Ptaszynski (2000) notes that companies operating in less familiar environments may not be aware of the 
severity and frequency of earthquakes, hurricanes, or other forces that make common risks potentially more severe.  
He indicates that buildings in many foreign locations may be constructed to what can be considered substandard 
codes and that in some countries, there are few central station monitoring companies for fire or burglary alarms.  
Weak water pressure and a lack of apparatus or trained professionals can hamper firefighting efforts, and political 
instability may increase losses due to graft and corruption, theft, or property damage from civil unrest.  Further, the 
consequences of inadequate preparation are severe: Fink (1986) and Offer (1998) found that 50 percent of 
businesses experiencing crises do not survive without an adequate mitigation and recovery plan, and Pedone (1997) 
notes that 90 percent of businesses without a disaster recovery plan will fail within two years of the occurrence of a 
disaster.    
 
Crisis management and small businesses 
 
The potential damage wrought by any of the crises listed in Table 1 is significant, but their impact may be 
magnified with respect to small businesses that traditionally are more limited in the capital and human resources 
needed for effective mitigation.  As such, it might be expected that small businesses, generally defined as those 
having fewer than 500 employees, would be more proactive with respect to managing crises since the consequences 
are potentially more severe. 
 
Spillan & Hough’s study of small businesses in Pennsylvania and New York, however, found that small 
businesses place little emphasis on planning for crises and that only the actual occurrence of a particular crisis 
impels businesses to plan against its reoccurrence.  Further, only 11 percent of businesses surveyed had crisis 
management teams, even though multiple studies (Barton, 1993; Caponigro, 1998; Hickman & Crandall, 1997; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998) provided compelling arguments for the creation of such teams, and Fink (1986) found that 
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organizations with no crisis management team reported that crises lasted two and a half times longer than those 
crises occurring in organizations with established teams.  Spillan & Hough further note small business managers 
justify their indifference toward crisis management with reasons such as lack of time, low probability of crises 
occurring, management’s perceived abilities to work their way through crises without plans or formal teams, and the 
often-false sense of security provided by insurance.    
 
Businesses operating in Guatemala, the majority of which are categorized as small, are not exempt from 
experiencing crises.  At certain historic points, political controversy and an unequal distribution of income have 
created serious vulnerabilities including sporadic guerilla attacks, kidnappings, and high profile murders (Rarick, 
2000).  The unequal distribution of income has exposed businesses to problems of internal corruption, robbery, and 
extortion. These factors create an environment where managers must be prepared for any of the variety of crises that 
may emerge in the conduct of business (www.latinsynergy.org).   
 




Since Guatemala exhibits many of the characteristics conducive to attracting FDI initiatives but still 
presents an environment vulnerable to potential crises, this study seeks to document prevailing attitudes found in 
Guatemalan businesses toward crisis management.  Central to this effort is determining if surveyed businesses have 
crisis management teams, and if the existence of such teams influences crisis management attitudes; examining how 
concern is generated regarding potential crisis events; and evaluating whether concern is generated more from the 
formation of a crisis management team or from the experience of a crisis event.  The hypotheses and survey 
instrument used in our 2003 study of U.S. businesses were extended to this work to provide a basis for comparison.   
 
Research Questions  
 
To gain insight into the crisis management philosophies of Guatemalan businesses, a study was conducted 
around the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis A – There is a higher degree of concern toward potential crises among Guatemalan businesses with 
crisis management teams than in those businesses with no such teams. 
 
Hypothesis B – Guatemalan businesses that have experienced crises are more concerned for those crises than those 
businesses that have not experienced crises. 
 
Hypothesis C – The degree of concern for a crisis event is dependent more on the actual occurrence of the crisis 
event than by the formation of a crisis management team. 
 
Survey instrument and data collection 
 
Data were collected using a survey instrument adapted from the instrument used by Crandall et. al. (1999), 
and based on the crisis events listed in Table 1.  The survey solicited basic information such as the type of business, 
number of employees, number of years in business, and if the respondent’s organization had a crisis management 
team.   
 
Related to the crisis events listed in Table 1, respondents were asked to rate the organization’s degree of 
concern for the occurrence of each event using a five-point Likert scale (“low” to “high”).  Respondents also were 
asked to indicate whether their organizations had experienced that event in the past three years.  Additionally, a 
letter was attached to the first page of the survey described the study and providing specific instructions regarding 
survey completion.   
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The study’s participants consisted of business owners and managers from 212 Guatemalan enterprises 
located in the cities of Coatepeque, Guatemala City, Mazaltenango, Quezaltenango, Retalhuleu, and San Marcos.  




T-tests and analyses of variance were used to evaluate the three hypotheses in an attempt to remain 
methodologically consistent with both the 1999 Crandall et al. and the 2003 Spillan & Hough research.  The first 
analysis examined the mean differences in degree of concern between businesses that had crisis management teams 
and those that did not.  The second analysis focused on analyzing the mean differences in degree of concern between 
those businesses which had experienced a particular crisis event and those which had not experienced that event.  
The third analysis assessed degree of concern as the dependent variable with the occurrence of an event and the 
existence of a crisis management team as the independent variables.   
 
ANOVAs and descriptive statistics were collected for the entire data set following testing for mean 
differences using t-tests.  Analyses were supported with a Scheffe post-hoc analysis to test for significant differences 




 The majority of Guatemalan participant organizations are small based on the measurement criterion number 
of employees.  Of the respondent companies, 189 (94 percent) indicated they had fewer than 50 employees while 11 
(5 percent) employed between 50 and 499 workers.  Overwhelmingly, the responding organizations lacked crisis 
management teams.  Only 19 (9 percent) respondents acknowledged the existence of a crisis management team, 
while 183 (86 percent) indicated they had no such team.  Ten organizations, or 5 percent, provided no response to 
the question.   
 
Results of analysis show that, for the most part, Guatemalan businesses with crisis management teams had 
no greater concern for potential crises than businesses without crisis management teams.  Table 2 ranks in 
descending order by t value the mean concern scores for businesses with crisis management teams to the mean 
scores for businesses lacking these teams for the crises detailed on the survey.  Of the 26 events listed, only 
computer system breakdown (t = 2.672, p=. 011) and death of key executive (t = 2.040, p=. 037) showed a 
significant difference in means at the .05 level.  Because only two of the 26 events (8 percent) displayed a 
significant difference in mean concern scores, hypothesis is not strongly supported. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the results of a comparison of mean concern values for Guatemalan businesses that had 
experienced a given crisis event to the mean concern values for those businesses that had not experienced the event.  
The crisis events are ranked in descending order by t value.  The results show significantly higher concern for a 
given crisis by businesses that had experienced the crisis as compared to concern for the event by businesses that 
had not experienced it. So, only after experiencing the devastating aftermath of a fire would concern be generated 
regarding future fires.  Businesses that experienced 23 of the 26 crisis events listed in the survey (88%) were 
significantly more concerned about those events at the .05 level than businesses that had not experienced those 
events.  Of the 23 events where significant differences occurred, differences for 21 events were significant even at 
the p=.01 level.  These findings confirm Hypothesisb, that those businesses that have experienced crises are more 
concerned for those crises than businesses that have not experienced the crises. 
 
Finally, an analysis was conducted using the degree of concern regarding a potential event as the dependent 
variable and the occurrence of a crisis event and the existence of a crisis management team as independent variables.  
This procedure was performed to determine which factor is more critical regarding concern in respondent 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Mean Concern Scores: Organizations With and Without Crisis Management Teams 
Concern for: 
Crisis Management Team? 
t p 
Yes No 
n Mean n Mean 
Computer system breakdown 28 3.14 95 2.01 2.672 0.011 
Death of key executive 31 3.19 103 2.36 2.040 0.037 
Hurricane 29 1.60 94 2.38 2.017 0.051 
Earthquake 29 2.52 94 1.81 1.759 0.086 
Loss of records – fire 30 1.53 102 2.14 1.684 0.095 
Theft/disappearance of records 34 3.35 116 2.72 1.619 0.108 
Flood 30 2.33 99 1.74 1.555 0.128 
Corporate espionage 31 2.29 101 1.87 1.188 0.237 
Product Recall 29 2.38 97 1.95 1.154 0.286 
Negative media coverage 29 1.55 92 1.91 1.044 0.299 
Employee Lawsuit 31 2.16 98 1.86 0.869 0.386 
Boycott by consumers or public 33 1.97 102 2.28 0.832 0.407 
Management corruption  34 2.53 103 2.26 0.718 0.474 
Employee violence in workplace 35 2.26 105 2.01 0.717 0.474 
Government investigation 30 1.93 99 1.73 0.621 0.535 
Breakdown of production/service equipment 31 1.77 96 1.60 0.584 0.561 
Major industrial accident 33 2.94 102 2.73 0.534 0.594 
Tornado 28 1.57 93 1.43 0.509 0.612 
Theft of company property 34 2.65 103 2.49 0.419 0.676 
Loss of records - computer 30 1.67 96 1.79 0.378 0.706 
Consumer lawsuit 29 1.69 97 1.58 0.368 0.713 
Major product/service malfunction 29 2.10 95 1.97 0.365 0.716 
Product sabotage 29 2.10 95 1.97 0.365 0.716 
Asset misappropriation 33 2.58 102 2.46 0.296 0.768 
Computer system invaded by hacker 31 2.03 98 1.98 0.147 0.884 
Employee embezzlement 33 3.06 105 3.02 0.103 0.918 
 
 
Table 4 illustrates that for 21 of the 26 crisis events (81 percent), the occurrence of the event significantly 
affected the level of concern for the event at the .05 level.  Results were significant even at the .01 level for 19 of the 
events.  The presence of a crisis management team did not significantly affect concern for any of the 26 events.  
Further, no significant interaction was found among the independent and dependent variables.  As a consequence, 
these findings strongly support Hypothesisc, that the degree of concern for a potential crisis event is dependent more 




Consistency of results 
 
FDI opportunities in Guatemala appear attractive given the country’s rich resources, low labor costs, large 
industrial base, and perceived strategic opportunistic position.  Interested TNCs, however, may find significant 
disparity between their well-developed crisis management philosophies and the indifferent attitude displayed by the 
Guatemalan businesses surveyed with respect to crisis planning initiatives.   
 
The results of this study show that few of the primarily small Guatemalan businesses surveyed have crisis 
management teams.  Additionally, the majority of responding businesses are indifferent to the importance of crisis 
planning.  The primary impetus to generate concern for a potential crisis event appears to be the occurrence of that 
actual event, and presumably a desire to avoid a reoccurrence of the event.  The few respondent firms that had crisis 
management teams had no greater concern for potential crises than those with no teams, indicating that simply 
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requiring suppliers to create crisis management teams will not effectively address the difference in crisis 




Comparison of Mean Concern Scores: Organizations That Have Had and Have Not Had A Crisis 
Concern for: 
Has Crisis Occurred? 
t p 
Yes No 
N Mean n Mean 
Computer system breakdown 28 4.43 94 1.55 9.562 0.000 
Asset misappropriation  37 4.03 92 1.71 7.509 0.000 
Major industrial accident 46 4.04 80 1.90 6.826 0.000 
Employee embezzlement  49 4.18 81 2.09 6.693 0.000 
Corporate espionage 21 4.05 105 1.53 6.229 0.000 
Theft of company property 37 3.92 92 1.88 6.165 0.000 
Product sabotage 16 4.00 105 1.61 5.969 0.000 
Boycott by consumers or public 23 4.09 100 1.60 5.702 0.000 
Product recall 22 3.91 100 1.56 5.688 0.000 
Management corruption  21 4.05 108 1.83 5.675 0.000 
Flood 10 4.20 114 1.56 5.638 0.000 
Death of key executive 44 3.64 81 1.79 5.437 0.000 
Hurricane 10 4.20 113 1.60 5.407 0.000 
Theft or disappearance of company records 52 3.92 88 2.23 5.292 0.000 
Employee lawsuit 22 3.55 103 1.47 4.740 0.000 
Earthquake 9 4.11 110 1.69 4.542 0.000 
Computer system invaded by hacker 11 3.91 114 1.74 4.341 0.000 
Tornado 2 5.00 119 1.44 4.005 0.000 
Employee violence in workplace 26 3.31 100 1.65 3.930 0.000 
Government investigation 25 2.92 102 1.47 3.390 0.002 
Loss of records - computer  9 3.67 115 1.56 3.107 0.013 
Loss of records – fire 5 4.20 123 1.88 3.054 0.003 
Breakdown of production/service equipment 6 3.67 116 1.48 2.563 0.049 
Major product/service malfunction 9 3.22 111 1.79 1.988 0.079 
Negative media coverage 13 2.54 103 1.62 1.582 0.137 
Consumer lawsuit 3 1.00 124 1.61 0.731 0.466 
 
 
While these findings are consistent with Spillan & Hough’s previous work, the implications for TNCs 
seeking FDI opportunities may be more significant.  U.S. firms making supply chain decisions typically enjoy 
numerous alternatives and relatively low switching costs.  If the crisis management philosophies of a supplier differ 
too greatly from those of the firm, it is likely that the firm can find a substitute supplier with minimal replacement 
cost. 
 
In contrast, TNCs developing FDI opportunities may be constrained by a limited number of viable 
suppliers and could face cultural, legal or economic consequences related to substitution.  These potential limitations 
emphasize the importance of investigating the crisis management attitudes likely to be encountered in firms 




Some of the greatest opportunities and challenges of globalization relate to differing cultural perspectives.  
Understanding the cultural environment in which businesses operate is imperative in identifying FDI initiatives with 
a high probability of success.  Ball & McCulloch (1999) stress the importance of understanding culture since it 
shapes perspectives and influences how managers address issues.   
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Independent Variables: (1) Existence of crisis management team (2) Occurrence of crisis event. 






A X B 
Interaction 
F p F p F p 
Loss of records - computer 10.85 0.00 1.96 0.15 3.76 0.06 
Management corruption 7.25 0.01 2.40 0.10 2.84 0.06 
Product sabotage 35.93 0.00 7.57 0.47 3.10 0.08 
Employee violence in workplace 0.84 0.36 0.24 0.79 2.24 0.11 
Theft/disappearance of records 26.91 0.00 1.46 0.24 2.13 0.15 
Major product/service malfunction 3.05 0.08 0.87 0.42 1.95 0.15 
Computer system invaded by hacker 5.61 0.02 2.56 0.08 1.64 0.20 
Hurricane 26.50 0.00 2.38 0.10 1.61 0.21 
Asset misappropriation  7.16 0.01 2.17 0.12 1.54 0.22 
Flood 31.41 0.00 1.41 0.25 1.38 0.24 
Loss of records - fire 8.55 0.00 1.39 0.25 0.86 0.36 
Major industrial accident 4.09 0.05 2.09 0.13 0.65 0.52 
Boycott by consumers or public 28.52 0.00 1.22 0.30 0.36 0.55 
Product recall 20.77 0.00 0.21 0.81 0.60 0.55 
Negative media coverage 2.90 0.09 0.94 0.39 0.18 0.68 
Theft of company property 30.06 0.00 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.69 
Death of key executive 2.63 0.11 1.73 0.18 0.36 0.70 
Employee embezzlement 32.39 0.00 0.88 0.42 0.15 0.70 
Employee lawsuit 31.42 0.00 0.32 0.73 0.12 0.73 
Computer system breakdown 69.19 0.00 1.34 0.27 0.12 0.73 
Earthquake 17.50 0.00 0.37 0.69 0.06 0.80 
Corporate espionage 23.36 0.00 0.31 0.74 0.05 0.82 
Tornado 15.60 0.00 0.38 0.69 0.00 0.96 
Government investigation 14.75 0.00 0.23 0.79 .001 0.97 
Breakdown of production/service equipment 14.19 0.00 0.19 0.83 0.00 0.99 
 
 
In Guatemala, family and tradition are powerful cultural themes.  The nuclear family and involvement in 
family activities are very important.  Many businesses are family-owned and passed down from generation to 
generation.  As such, family issues sometimes take precedent over business concerns.  While business viability is 
important to the economic well being of Guatemalans, it is not necessarily a top priority.   
 
The strong orientation toward tradition dictates that business is often conducted using the same principles 
and infrastructures that were prevalent fifty years ago (www.state.gov). Change is slow and managers generally 
have a short-term orientation with respect to decision-making, rather than the longer-term orientation traditionally 
necessary to engage in strategic thinking initiatives including crisis management.  The Latin tendency to deal with 
issues “tomorrow” is quite evident (Roman & Cordova, 1998), and may contribute to a predisposition not only to 
delay planning activities, but to discount potential crisis signals.  These cultural proclivities contribute to an 
environment where little emphasis placed on crisis management and make it unlikely that crisis prevention activities 
will ever be regarded seriously. 
 
Implications for TNCs considering Guatemalan FDI initiatives 
 
As the study results illustrate, Guatemalan businesses are not immune to crises.  All 26 crisis events from 
Table 1 actually occurred to some percentage of the businesses surveyed.  Although only two businesses (1 percent) 
experienced tornadoes, 52 businesses (25 percent) experienced theft or disappearance of company records and 49 
businesses (23 percent) were victims of employee embezzlement.   
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Clearly, Guatemalan businesses are no less immune to potential disasters than their counterparts elsewhere.  
In Guatemala, however, cultural themes such as family, tradition, and a short-term orientation may influence 
attitudes counterproductive to crisis management.  TNCs interested in investing in Guatemala should consider these 
factors when evaluating potential FDI opportunities.  
 
Suggestions for future research 
 
 Both Spillan & Hough’s 2003 study of small businesses in Pennsylvania and New York, and this study of 
primarily small Guatemalan businesses conclude that, although crisis management activities can be critical to a 
firm’s survival, scant attention is afforded them.  Further study is warranted to determine if these indifferent 
attitudes toward crisis planning are universal among small business owners, and to assess whether external factors 
such as governmental regulation, commercial pressure, and training can positively influence perceptions regarding 
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